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Abstract
The distributed data storage systems are constructed by large number
of nodes which are interconnected over a network. Each node in such
peer-to-peer network is vulnerable and at a potential risk for attack. The
attackers can eavesdrop the nodes and possibly modify their data. Hence
distributed storage systems should be secure apart from satisfying the
reconstruction and repair requirements. We constructed a distributed
storage system, Twin MDS code framework which is more efficient than
the regenerating codes based storage systems. We prove that this Twin
MDS code framework gives better performance than MBR codes and equal
with MSR codes in the distribution process and investigate its security
performance comparing with the security of the MBR and MSR codes.
Such Twin MDS code framework is examined in an eavesdropper model
where passive attackers can access to the stored data or/and downloaded
data during the repair process. We demonstrate that the Twin MDS code
framework manages better results than MBR and MSR codes regarding
the security in the system.
twin-code framework, distributed storage systems (DSS), eavesdropper, information-
theoretic secrecy, security in DSS, minimum bandwidth regenerating codes, min-
imum storage regenerating codes
1 Introduction
Cloud storage is often implemented by complex multitiered distributed systems
on clusters of thousands of commodity servers. These systems known as dis-
tributed storage systems (DSS) store different types of data-files (messages)
dispersed across the distributed servers (nodes) in the network. DSS are com-
monplace nowadays, they operate in several environments such as peer-to-peer
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(P2P) systems and data centers that comprise the backbone infrastructure of
cloud computing. Main advantage offered by the distributed storage systems is
reliable and cost-effective storage of large amounts of data. With the number of
its components increasing (storage nodes, but also routers, network, power sup-
ply, cooling, etc.), an DSS ends up having a significant (even if small) subset of
these components not functioning properly at almost any time instance. Thus,
fault tolerance to make the overall system and its services transparent from the
underlying faults is essential. This is achieved by the addition of redundancy.
Redundancy is accomplished in many different manners.The most simplest
and common form applied in these systems for achieving the redundancy is
by using replication schemes. Three-times data replication as an industrial
standard is the simplest form of protective data redundancy, with two more
additional copies of the original object being created and maintained to be
available if the original gets lost. The more redundancy is used, the more fault-
tolerant the DSS becomes. But the redundancy increases the overheads of the
storage infrastructure. Data to be stored is not reducing overtime, and a study
sponsored by the information storage company EMC estimated that the worlds
data is more than doubling every two years. [1]
The demand for data storage is astonishing, due to the new emerging ap-
plications like social networks analysis, semantic Web analysis, bioinformatics
network analysis, city sensing and monitoring, and additional variety of data
that should be managed daily through the communication broadband networks.
For instance, human beings now create 2.5 PB bytes of data per day. The rate
of data creation has increased so much that 90% of the data in the world today
has been created in the last two years alone [2]. Significant impact from the
emerging world also have big companies, governments, militaries, banks and
any kind of organization and group that have need for storage of big amount of
sensitive information.
Towards finding optimal solution, some of the challenges for managing the
enormous amount of data and efficient processing, storage and maintaining of
the data are elaborated in [3–6]. A smarter solution with less redundancy and
better reliability is offered by erasure codes. Maximum Distance Separable
(MDS) codes are erasure codes that are good choice for successful reconstruction
of the entire message that is performed by the user (data collector).
Let S is the size in symbols (can be bits or digits in general) of the data file
that needs to be stored in the distributed network. Suppose that this file of size
S is divided into k pieces which are mapped to n encoded fragments using an
(n, k) MDS code, and all encoded pieces are stored on n distinct nodes in the
network. The data can be retrieved by accessing the encoded fragments from
any k of these n nodes, and carrying out a reconstruction (decoding). When
a node fails, α = S
k
symbols are affected. Therefore, a new replacement node
(newcomer) must be added in the network that will perform the repair process
for the missing data. This process allows the newcomer to contact at least k
active nodes, downloads the entire data stored on them and after that to execute
adequate operations for extracting the exact lost data stored on the failed node.
This strategy is a waste of communication bandwidth if only one encoded
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fragment is needed, though its cost is depreciated if repairs are delayed, and
multiple repairs are carried out together. Even in the case of delayed repair,
the newcomer remains a bottleneck, which might slower the repairs. Meaning, a
slower repair process can in turn adversely affect the long term data durability.
Therefore, a new concept of codes called regenerating codes which can be seen
as a combination of an erasure code and a network code initially was proposed
by Dimakis et al. [7].
In the regenerating codes the parameter d is the number of nodes out of
n−1 that are going to be contacted during the repair process and the parameter
β (β ≤ α) is the size of data that will be downloaded from each of the d nodes.
The correlation between the total downloaded amount dβ = γ is known as repair
bandwidth and the storage α is studied in [8–11] for achieving better results.
The parameters in the regenerating code that aim to store the maximum file
size S reliably must satisfy the following condition examined in [7]
S ≤
k−1∑
i=0
min {α, (d− i)β} . (1)
Based on the tradeoff between α and γ the two extreme points can be ob-
tained presented in [7]. In the reconstruction case when the storage per node
α tends to be at least S
k
the extreme point is termed as the Minimum Storage
Regeneration (MSR) point. The MSR point is achieved by the pair
(αMSR, γMSR) =
(
S
k
,
S
k
d
d− k + 1
)
. (2)
Otherwise, in a case when the repair bandwidth dβ is equal to α, the extreme
point is referred as the Minimum Bandwidth Regeneration (MBR) point that
is achieved by the pair
(αMBR , γMBR) =
(
S
k
2d
2d− k + 1
,
S
k
2d
2d− k + 1
)
. (3)
Since both extreme conditions cannot be satisfied at the same time, K . V.
Rashmi et al. [12] propose a new concept for distributed storage network, called
Twin–code framework that eases data-reconstruction and node-repair during
failure of some nodes in the network.
Because the distributed data storage system is formed by many nodes widely
spread across the Internet, each node in such peer-to-peer network is vulnerable
and a potential point for attack. The attackers can eavesdrop the nodes and
possibly modify their data. Securing such data from adversaries/eavesdroppers
is necessary to ensure data secrecy for the users. Hence DSS should be se-
cure apart from satisfying the reconstruction and repair requirements. Some
researches that covers the topic of security are formulated in [13–20]. This pa-
per, besides the reliability of the stored data addresses the issue of its security.
In our analysis we concentrate on a passive eavesdropper who can eavesdrop on
nodes in the system or/and on newcomers during the repair process.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II recalls the Twin-
code framework functioning and its advantages. In Section III by comparing the
reconstruction and repair process of minimum bandwidth (MBR) and minimum
storage regenerating (MSR) codes vs. the Twin-codes, we show that the number
of message symbols that can be distributed in the Twin-code storage system is
greater than the number of message symbols distributed by MBR codes and
equal with the number of message symbols distributed by MSR codes. In Sec-
tion IV we construct a new secure Twin-code framework in presence of passive
adversary and show that our proposed secure scheme gives better secrecy per-
formance than both MBR and MSR codes. Section V concludes the paper.
2 Twin-code framework
In the Twin–code framework all nodes are partitioned into two groups: nodes of
Type 1 (circles) and nodes of Type 2 (squares) as depicted in Fig.1. To achieve
the data stored on Type 1 nodes, the message is encoded using a linear code
C1; and the data on Type 2 nodes, first the message symbols are permuted by
transposition and then encoded by a second linear code C2. It is not necessary
the two codes to be distinct. In the case of data reconstruction, the data collector
will contact a feasible subset of nodes of the same type for recovering the entire
message, as shown in Fig. 1 (a).
Type 2 storage node
(a) (b)
Reparation of Type 1 nodeType 1 storage node
Data CollectorDC
DC
Figure 1: Twin-code framework: (a) Data reconstruction. (b) Repair process.
When a node from each type fails, the repair process is accomplished by
downloading data from a feasible subset of nodes from the opposite type, as
shown in Fig. 1 (b).
Without loss of generality, we can separate the nodes in the Twin-code
framework into systematic and parity nodes. The node is systematic if the
stored symbols on it are original. And if the symbols on the node are not pure
original, but some combination of them, then the node is parity. We assume
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repair process of only systematic nodes.
2.1 Encoding
There are n1 Type 1 nodes, and n2 Type 2, where n = n1 + n2 is the total
number of storage nodes in the framework. Note that the storage nodes of both
types have the same characteristics.
In the sequel we use the following notations:
1. The original message consists of STW symbols which belong to a finite
field Fq;
2. Ci, i = 1, 2 is an arbitrary (ni, k) linear code over Fq with generator matrix
Gi;
3. g(i,j) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ ni is the j-th column of Gi, i = 1, 2.
The original message is first split into k fragments of k symbols, such that,
STW = k
2. Hence, these S symbols are arranged into a square (k × k) matrix
A1. This matrix is called a message matrix. Let
A2 , A
T
1 , (4)
where the superscript T denotes a transpose of a matrix. For i = 1, 2 each node
of Type i stores k symbols from the appropriate column of the (k × ni) matrix
AiGi, i.e., in the node j (1 ≤ j ≤ ni) of Type i we store the symbols from the
j-th column of the matrix AiGi, i = 1, 2 in Fig. 2 defined by
Aig(i,j). (5)
With this encoding algorithm every node stores k symbols and each node j of
Type i is associated with a different column g(i,j) of Gi, called encoding vector
of that node. With this algorithm the data is encoded and mapped into the
network.
2.2 Twin MDS Codes for data – reconstruction and node
repair
For the case where the linear codes C1 and C2 are MDS codes over Fq, the
data collector can perform the reconstruction process of the entire message only
with contacting any k nodes. All connected nodes must be of same type. The
amount of stored data that will be downloaded during this process is k2 = STW.
In general, it is important to note that the connectivity in such Twin-framework
system must be at least 2k−1 for satisfactory availability and higher guarantees.
In the case of a failed node, the newcomer from certain type must contact
any k nodes belonging to the opposite type. To recover the lost data just a single
symbol from each node will be downloaded, that is β = 1. For a successful repair
5
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Figure 2: Encoding within the Twin-code framework.
process, in any moment, k nodes from Type 1 and k nodes from the Type 2
must be alive.
For example, if we assume that node m from Type 1 fails, the newcomer
(replacement node) must recover the following k symbols A1g(1,m). There-
fore, the newcomer contacts k helper nodes of Type 2. The jr–th helper node
(1 ≤ jr ≤ n2) for all r, 1 ≤ r ≤ k, sends the product of the encoding vector
g(1,m)with the k symbols of the helper node A2g(2,jr), i.e. g
T
(1,m)A2g(2,jr). So,
the replacement node obtains access to the k symbols
gT(1,m)A2
[
g(2,j1) . . .g(2,jk)
]
. (6)
Defining
τ
T , gT(1,m)A2, (7)
the newcomer has access to
τ
T
[
g(2,j1) . . .g(2,jk)
]
(8)
and τ T is recovered by erasure decoding of the MDS code C2.
Therefore, the k symbols that have to be recovered at the newcomer are the
symbols contained into the vector
A1g(1,m) =
(
gT(1,m)A2
)T
= τ . (9)
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A1 =


a1 a5 a9 a13
a2 a6 a10 a14
a3 a7 a11 a15
a4 a8 a12 a16


Node 1
Node 2
Node 3
Node 4
Node 5
a1 a2 a3 a4
a5 a6 a7 a8
a9 a10 a11 a12
a13 a14 a15 a16
a1+a5+a9+a13 a2+a6+a10+a14 a3+a7+a11+a15 a4+a8+a12+a16
( )T
Node 1
Node 2
Node 3
Node 4
Node 5
Node 6
a1 a5 a9 a13
a2 a6 a10 a14
a3 a7 a11 a15
a1+a2+a3+a4 a5+a6+a7+a8 a9+a10+a11+a12 a13+a14+a15+a16
a1+4a2+3a3+2a4 a5+4a6+3a7+2a8 a9+4a10+3a11+2a12 a13+4a14+3a15+2a16
a1+3a2+4a3+2a4 a5+3a6+4a7+2a8 a9+3a10+4a11+2a12 a13+3a14+4a15+2a16
G2
G1
Figure 3: An example of distributing information within the Twin-code frame-
work with parameters n1 = 5, n2 = 6 and k = 4.
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Thus, the repair process of a Type 1 node is brought to the erasure decoding of
the code C2.
Example 1 : We illustrate the encoding in Twin-code framework with the
following example. It will be used to discuss the security in the Twin-code
framework. Let distribute the message of STW = 16 symbols arranged in mes-
sage matrix
A1 =


a1 a5 a9 a13
a2 a6 a10 a14
a3 a7 a11 a15
a4 a8 a12 a16


in the network with n1 = 5 nodes of Type 1 and n2 = 6 nodes of Type 2 shown
in Fig. 3. The Twin-MDS code generator matrices over F11 are
G1 =


1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1

 , G2 =


1 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 4 3
0 0 1 1 3 4
0 0 0 1 2 2

 .
The data collector can reconstruct the information by contacting any k = 4
nodes of the same type.
2.3 Advantages of the Twin – code framework in data
reconstruction and repair processes
Using the Twin method, all encoding operations, data reconstruction and repair
processes employ encoding and decoding algorithms according to the appropri-
ate code. This makes the Twin framework method robust. Employing the
existing code in the Twin-code framework is one of the main advantages. This
feature allows utilization of any linear erasure code. Moreover, regarding the
repair process only one of the erasure codes will be used, which reduces the com-
plexity of the decoding process. Another positive impact is the reduced repair
overhead. The repair algorithm in a Twin-code network is such that the symbols
passed through the helper node are identity independent from the other nodes
that help in the repair process. In other words, the replacement node encoding
vector does not depend on the encoding vectors of the helper nodes.
Furthermore, Twin–code framework is very efficient in a data deployment in
distributed storage network, since the data reconstruction and repair process are
simple to be accomplished. This process starts with the source transmitting the
encoded data to a subset of nodes, which means some of the nodes in the system
stay empty. Then the empty nodes can be treated as replacement nodes and
the process of data deployment will be finished with the help of their adjacent
coded nodes as depicted in Fig. 4. This feature makes the traffic more uniform
across the network. Finally, concerning the error detection and correction, the
Twin-code network will use only the appropriate error correcting code from the
constituent codes to resolve the error detection and correction problems.
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SS Source of data
Node without data
(i)
(iii)
Nodes with coded data
(ii)
(iv)
Figure 4: Data deployment in Twin-code distributed storage network: (i) Source
of data distributes coded data to a subset of nodes. (ii), (iii) These live nodes
help in the repair process of nodes that have lost their data. (iv) Final state of
the system.
3 Comparison of data–reconstruction and node
repair in DSS within regenerating codes and
in Twin-code framework
In this section we compare the upper bounds of the number of message symbols
that can be distributed by MBR and MSR codes with the maximum number of
message symbols distributed within Twin MDS code framework and we show
that the Twin MDS code framework gives better performance in a distributed
file size than MBR codes and same performance as MSR codes.
The repair process within regenerating codes is established by downloading
β symbols from any subset of the remaining d (n ≥ d ≥ k) nodes. The total
repair bandwidth dβ is usually smaller than the size of the message S. In [7],
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authors also establish that the parameters satisfy the bound
S ≤
k−1∑
i=0
min (α, (d− i)β) . (10)
MBR codes achieve minimal possible repair bandwidth dβ = α, i.e., the
node downloads only what it stores. Plugging dβ = α in (10), and replacing
the inequality with equality, an MBR code, with no secrecy requirements, must
satisfy
S =
(
kd−
(
k
2
))
β. (11)
Since in the Twin MDS code framework the repair bandwidth is β = 1, we
compare it with MBR codes with the same bandwidth. MBR codes with β = 1
have data storage α = d and are constructed such that the message matrix is
populated by S message symbols
S =
(
kd−
(
k
2
))
= k (d− k) +
k (k + 1)
2
. (12)
MSR codes achieve minimum possible storage at each node. Knowing that
the message size is S, each node stores α = S
k
data. For message reconstruction,
the data-collector contacts any k nodes. Based on that statement, from (10)
and replacing the inequality with equality when there is no secrecy requirement,
MSR codes must satisfy
S = kα and dβ = α+ (k − 1)β. (13)
Observing the case for code construction when β = 1 the equation (13)
becomes
d = α+ (k − 1) . (14)
Based on above stated further is made comparison between the data distri-
bution process performed by the regenerating codes and the Twin MDS code
framework. In the Twin MDS code framework, by definition, the size of the
message that can be distributed in the system is maximum STW = k
2. When
the size of the message is larger than k2 symbols, the message first is divided into
fragments of size k2. In that case, the method is applied to each of these frag-
ments and at the end all of them are concatenated. Plugging β = 1, α = d = k
in (12), the size of the distributed file with MBR codes becomes
S =
k (k + 1)
2
. (15)
Comparing the message size from (15) and the size of the message in the
Twin MDS code framework STW, we notice that the number of message symbols
that can be distributed in the Twin MDS code storage system is greater or equal
10
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Figure 5: Comparison of the size of the message that can be distributed in Twin
MDS code framework (times signs) and in DSS with MBR code (diamonds) and
MSR code (stars) for k = 3, ..., 50 pieces in which the message is divided.
to the number of message symbols distributed by MBR codes in the special case
when β = 1 and α = d = k, i.e.,
STW = k
2 ≥ S =
k (k + 1)
2
.
Since in the Twin MDS codes the connectivity must be at least d = 2k − 1,
for the comparison of the file size distributed in Twin MDS code and the file
size in the DSS with MSR codes we plugging d = 2k − 1 in (14). Therefore,
the node storage should be α = k and the size of the distributed file with MSR
codes is S = k2. This indicates that the number of message symbols that can
be distributed in the Twin MDS code storage system is the same as the number
of message symbols distributed by MSR codes when β = 1 and d = 2k− 1, i.e.,
STW = k
2 = S = k2.
In Fig. 5. we compare the size of the message symbols stored in the Twin
MDS code framework and DSS with MBR and MSR codes. The size of the
message symbols in all storage systems increases as the number of the number
of the pieces k in which the message is divided increases. However, the file size
when β = 1 and α = d = k that supports the Twin MDS code framework is
greater than the file size supported by MBR codes, and when β = 1, d = 2k− 1
the file size distributed in Twin MDS code framework is equal with the file size
supported by MSR codes.
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4 Secrecy in DSS
In this section we consider the upper bounds of the achievable secure file size
that can be distributed in a network by MBR and MSR codes in presence of
passive adversary. Next in the following subsections respectively, we construct
a new secure Twin MDS code framework for which we calculate the number of
message symbols that can be securely stored in. In addition, we prove that the
achievable secure file size stored in a network by MBR and MSR codes is less
than the stored secure file size in this new Twin MDS code framework.
We consider an (l1, l2) eavesdropper model, l = l1 + l2 < k, defined in [15]
where an eavesdropper may gain access to: either the data stored in a subset
of l1 storage nodes, where the set of eavesdropped indices is denoted by E1,
or to the data downloaded during the repair process of other l2 nodes, where
the set of these observed indices is denoted by E2, or both. This concept is
a generalized version from the eavesdropper model considered by Pawar et al.
in [13] and [14]. In [13] an eavesdropper may gain access only to the data stored
on the nodes, which indicates to the MBR point. When the repair bandwidth
is strictly greater than the per node storage, then is considered the MSR point,
meaning an eavesdropper gains more information if it has access to the data
downloaded during node repair if compared to the case when it observes only the
data stored on the node. The achievability of security in this (l1, l2) eavesdropper
model is formalized by the following definition:
Definition 1 (Security in an (l1, l2) Eavesdropper [15]) Consider a DSS
in which an eavesdropper gains access to the data stored on some l1 nodes, and
the data downloaded during repair on some other l2 nodes. An (l1, l2) secure
distributed storage system with secure file size S(s) is such, where an eavesdrop-
per obtains no information about the message, i.e. I(f s; e) = 0, where f s is the
secure information of size S(s), and e represents the eavesdropper’s observation.
In [13], Pawar et al. provided an upper bound to the number of message
symbols S(s) that can securely be stored in the system in presence of l eaves-
droppers. The bound is given by
S(s) ≤
k−1∑
i=l
min (α, (d− i)β) . (16)
Since here we discuss about the exact repair for the MBR codes dβ = α,
the replacement node downloads only the original stored data. In this case
the eavesdropper cannot obtain any extra downloaded information from the
repair process. Thus, without loss of generality it may be assumed that l2 = 0.
Therefore, the upper bound for secure MBR codes from the equation (16) can
be obtained with substituting α = dβ and replacing the inequality with equality.
The upper bound of the MBR codes is
S(s) =
(
kd−
(
k
2
))
β −
(
ld−
(
l
2
))
β. (17)
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Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5
r1
r2
r3
r4
r5
r6
r7
r8
a9
a10
a11
a12
a13
a14
a15
a16
r1 + r5 + a9 + a13
r2 + r6 + a10 + a14
r3 + r7 + a11 + a15
r4 + r8 + a12 + a16
Type 1 nodes
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5 Node 6
r1 r2 r3 r1 + r2 + r3 + r4 r1 + 4r2 + 3r3 + 2r4 r1 + 3r2 + 4r3 + 2r4
r5 r6 r7 r5 + r6 + r7 + r8 r5 + 4r6 + 3r7 + 2r8 r5 + 3r6 + 4r7 + 2r8
a9 a10 a11 a9 + a10 + a11 + a12a9 + 4a10 + 3a11 + 2a12a9 + 3a10 + 4a11 + 2a12
a13 a14 a15 a13 + a14 + a15 + a16a13 + 4a14 + 3a15 + 2a16a13 + 3a14 + 4a15 + 2a16
(i)
Type 2 nodes
Type 1 nodes
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5
r1 r5 a9 a13 r1 + r5 + a9 + a13
r2 r6 a10 a14 r2 + r6 + a10 + a14
r3 r7 a11 a15 r3 + r7 + a11 + a15
r4 r8 a12 a16 r4 + r8 + a12 + a16
Type 2 nodes
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5 Node 6
r1 r2 r3 r1 + r2 + r3 + r4 r1 + 4r2 + 3r32 + 2r4 r1 + 3r2 + 4r32 + 2r4
r5 r6 r7 r5 + r6 + r7 + r8 r5 + 4r6 + 3r7 + 2r8 r5 + 3r6 + 4r7 + 2r8
a9 a10 a11 a9 + a10 + a11 + a12 a9 + 4a10 + 3a11 + 2a12 a9 + 3a10 + 4a11 + 2a12
a13 a14 a15 a13 + a14 + a15 + a16 a13 + 4a14 + 3a15 + 2a16a13 + 3a14 + 4a15 + 2a16
(ii)
Figure 6: Security in Twin (5, 4) MDS - (6, 4) MDS code in presence of two
eavesdroppers: (i) Two nodes from different types are eavesdropped; (ii) Two
nodes from same type, Type 1 are eavesdropped.
For MSR codes, the eavesdropper has an access to l1 nodes, and listens l2
nodes that are in the reparation process. In [20] Goparaju et al. have established
an upper bound of the achievable secure file size in presence of both types of
attack,
S(s) = (k − l1 − l2)
(
1−
1
d− k + 1
)l2
α. (18)
Therefore, to obtain secure coding schemes at the MBR and MSR point that
have better rate and/or secrecy capacity than that of the schemes proposed
in [15] and [20] is a challenge.
In this section, we define a new secure Twin MDS framework in presence of
an (l1, l2) eavesdropper and we show that this framework gives better secrecy
performance than MBR codes when β = 1, α = d = k and l2 = 0, (l1 < k) and
than the MSR codes when β = 1, d = 2k − 1 and l = l1 + l2 (l < k). In the
paper we use the following lemma to show that the proposed framework satisfy
the secrecy constraints.
Lemma 1 (Secrecy Lemma [15]) Consider a system with secure informa-
tion fs, random symbols r (independent of fs), and an eavesdropper with ob-
servations given by e. If H(e) ≤ H(r) and H(r|fs, e) = 0, then the mutual
information leakage to eavesdropper is zero, i.e., I(fs; e) = 0.
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I(fs; e) = H(e)−H(e|fs)
(a)
≤ H(e)−H(e|fs) +H(e|fs, r)
(b)
≤ H(r)− I(e; r|fs)
(c)
= H(r|fs, e)
(d)
= 0
(a) follows by non-negativity of H(e|fs, r), (b) is the condition H(e) ≤ H(r),
(c) is due to H(r|fs) = H(r) as r and fs are independent, (d) is the condition
H(r|fs, e) = 0.
4.1 Secure Twin MDS code framework
In this subsection, we present explicit construction for a coding scheme that
is secure against an (l1, l2) eavesdropper when E1 ∪ E2 ⊂ E , for a given set E
of size |E| < k, all parameter values [n, k, d = k] and α = k, β = 1. The
constructions is based on Twin MDS codes such that the message matrix first
is modified with STW − S
(s)
TW random symbols, where S
(s)
TW is the number of
message symbols that can be securely stored in a Twin MDS framework in an
(l1, l2) eavesdropper model.
First, we state the following property associated with the repair process in
a Twin-code framework.
Lemma 2
1. Assume that an eavesdropper gains access to the data stored on l = l1
nodes in a Twin MDS code framework. Then the eavesdropper can only
observe lk independent symbols.
2. Assume that an eavesdropper has an access to the data stored on any l1
nodes and observes the downloaded data from l2 nodes that are in repara-
tion process in a Twin MDS code framework. Then the (l1, l2) eavesdropper
can observe at most k(l1 + l2) independent symbols.
1. Since the size of the stored data on each node is k symbols by the construc-
tion of Twin MDS code the maximum number of independent symbols that
the intruder can reveal is lk if E1 ⊂ [k]
1 or E2 ⊂ [k]
2 , i.e., when it gains
access in the data stored on l1 nodes of the same type.
2. From Lemma 2, 1) in an (l1, l2) eavesdropper model, (l1 + l2) < k the intruder
can only observe kl1 independent symbols when it gains access in the data stored
on l1 nodes. Since in Twin MDS code framework the repair bandwidth is k,
i.e., a newcomer node of a certain type can recover the symbols stored in the
failed node by downloading a single symbol from any k nodes of the other type,
the maximum number of independent symbols that the intruder can reveal is
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kl2 if E2 ⊂ N1 or E2 ⊂ N2 when it gains access the downloaded data of l2 failed
systematic nodes of same type. Therefore, the maximum number of message
symbols that the intruder can reveal if it can read-access the data stored in l1
nodes and read-access the downloaded data during the repair process of l2 failed
systematic nodes is k(l1 + l2).
Now, we detail an achievability scheme of this section. There are n1 Type 1
nodes, and n2 Type 2 nodes, where n = n1 + n2 is the total number of storage
nodes in the framework. Note that the storage nodes of both types have the
same characteristics. In the sequel we use the following notations:
• [k] is a set of indices of any k repair nodes (nodes involved in repair
process).
• [k]1 is a set of indices of any k nodes of Type 1 and [k]2 is a set of indices
of any k nodes of Type 2.
• N1 (|N1| ≤ k) is a set of indices of systematic nodes of Type 1 and N2
(|N2| ≤ k) is a set of indices of systematic nodes of Type 2.
Let fs is secure information of size S
(s)
TW = k(k − l) or S
(s)
TW = k(k − l1 − l2)
in Fq at MBR and MSR points, respectively, i.e., f
s = (a1, a2, ..., ak(k−l)) or
fs = (a1, a2, ..., ak(k−l1−l2)). We take kl or k(l1 + l2) i.i.d. random symbols
r = (r1, ..., rkl) or r = (r1, ..., rk(l1+l2)) at MBR and MSR points, respectively;
distributed uniformly at random over Fq, and append r to obtain f = (r, f
s) ∈
Fq, that will be encoded in the following manner:
• Arrange the message f = (f1, ..., fk2) into (k × k) matrix
A1 =


r1 ... r(l−1)k+1 a1 ak+1 ... a(k−l−1)k+1
r2 ... r(l−1)k+2 a2 ak+2 ... a(k−l−1)k+2
. ... . . . ... .
rk ... rlk ak a2k ... ak(k−l)

 .
• Use the encoding algorithm defined in Section II. A.
With this algorithm the data is encoded and mapped into the network.
Next, we present the following results of security for the general coding scheme
described above.
Theorem 1
1. The code based on Twin MDS code that is modifying the message matrix
with kl random symbols, explained as above achieves a secure file size
k(k − l) in an (l1, l2) eavesdropper model, where l2 = 0 and l = l1 < k at
MBR point with = k and β = 1.
2. The code based on Twin MDS code that is modifying the message matrix
with k(l1 + l2) random symbols, explained as above achieves a secure file
size k(k − l1 − l2) in an (l1, l2) eavesdropper model, where E2 ⊂ N1 ∪N2,
l1 + l2 < k at MBR point with = k, β = 1 and d = 2k − 1.
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Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5
r1
r2
r3
r4
r5
r6
r7
r8
a9
a10
a11
a12
a13
a14
a15
a16
r1 + r5 + a9 + a13
r2 + r6 + a10 + a14
r3 + r7 + a11 + a15
r4 + r8 + a12 + a16
Type 1 nodes
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5 Node 6
r1 r3 r1 + r2 + r3 + r4 r1 + 4r2 + 3r3 + 2r4 r1 + 3r2 + 4r3 + 2r4
r5 r7 r5 + r6 + r7 + r8 r5 + 4r6 + 3r7 + 2r8 r5 + 3r6 + 4r7 + 2r8
a9 a11 a9 + a10 + a11 + a12a9 + 4a10 + 3a11 + 2a12a9 + 3a10 + 4a11 + 2a12
a13 a15 a13 + a14 + a15 + a16a13 + 4a14 + 3a15 + 2a16a13 + 3a14 + 4a15 + 2a16
(i)
Type 2 nodes
Type 1 nodes
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5
r1 r5 a9 a13 r1 + r5 + a9 + a13
r2 r6 a10 a14 r2 + r6 + a10 + a14
r3 r7 a11 a15 r3 + r7 + a11 + a15
r4 r8 a12 a16 r4 + r8 + a12 + a16
Type 2 nodes
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5 Node 6
r1 r2 r3 r1 + r2 + r3 + r4 r1 + 4r2 + 3r32 + 2r4 r1 + 3r2 + 4r32 + 2r4
r5 r6 r7 r5 + r6 + r7 + r8 r5 + 4r6 + 3r7 + 2r8 r5 + 3r6 + 4r7 + 2r8
a9 a10 a11 a9 + a10 + a11 + a12 a9 + 4a10 + 3a11 + 2a12 a9 + 3a10 + 4a11 + 2a12
a13 a14 a15 a13 + a14 + a15 + a16 a13 + 4a14 + 3a15 + 2a16a13 + 3a14 + 4a15 + 2a16
(ii)
Figure 7: (l1, l2)=(1,1) eavesdropper at the first and second node of Type 2
nodes, respectively in Twin (5,4) MDS - (6,4) MDS code framework. (i) Encoded
symbols obtained by an eavesdropper by observing repair of node 2 of Type 2.
(ii) Encoded symbols obtained by eavesdropping the first node from Type 2 and
observing repair of the second node from Type 2.
1. The repair and data reconstruction properties of the proposed code fol-
low from the construction code in [12]. We use Lemma 1 to prove the
security of this code against an (l1, l2) eavesdropper with l2 = 0, l = l1.
Considering that e denotes the symbols observed by an eavesdropper, we
need to show: (i) H(e) ≤ H(r) and (ii) H(r|fs, e) = 0. It follows from
Lemma 2, 1) that an eavesdropper observes kl independent symbols, and
since |e| = kl, follows that H(e) = H(r), which is the first requirement
for establishing the security claim. It remains H(r|fs, e) = 0, i.e., to show
that given the message symbols as side information, an eavesdropper can
decode all the random symbols. To this end, without loss of generality we
assume that the eavesdropper gain access to the data stored on l nodes
of Type 1. Now, define A
(s)
1 as a (k × k) matrix obtained by setting all
symbols of the secure file fs in A1 to zero. Thus A
(s)
1 has its first l columns
identical to that of A1, and zeros elsewhere. Let e˜ = A
(s)
1
[
g(1,1) . . .g(1,l)
]
are the lk symbols that the eavesdropper has access to, given the se-
cure message symbols as side information. The MDS property of code C1
guarantees linear independence of the corresponding l columns of gener-
ator matrix
[
g(1,1) . . .g(1,l)
]
. So, recovering the random symbols r from
e˜ is identical to data reconstruction in the original C˜1 code designed for
(n1, k = l) and no eavesdroppers. Thus, given the secure message symbols,
the eavesdropper can decode all the random symbols, i.e., H(r|fs, e) = 0.
2. Similar as the proof of Theorem 1, 1).
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The security achievement of the Twin MDS code framework applied in Ex-
ample 1 is presented in Fig. 6. In this scenario we consider the passive type l1
attack. The number of nodes that are compromised is l1 = 2. In Fig. 6 (i), one
compromised node belongs to the nodes of Type 1 and the other one is of Type
2 nodes; more precisely Node 1 of Type 1 and Node 2 of Type 2 are affected. We
note that the intruder reveals seven message symbols {r1, r2, r3, r4, r6, a10, a14}.
That is less than the maximum number of message symbols that the intruder
can reveal since it eavesdrops two nodes, i.e., lk = 8 compromised message
symbols. Therefore, although the data collector can reconstruct the information,
l1 = 2 compromised nodes (less by assumption than k = 4) are not sufficient for
the intruder to reveal the entire message. The situation for providing security
in the system is similar for the situation in Fig. 6 (ii). The only difference here
is that both compromised nodes belong to the same type of nodes: Node 2 and
Node 3 of Type 1 nodes. In this case the intruder reveals the maximum number
of message symbols when it eavesdrops two nodes, but still can not reveal the
information which is distributed in the system.
Example 2: In this example, we illustrate the security in Twin MDS code
framework in presence of eavesdroppers that can gain access both to stored data
in l1 = 1 node and to downloaded data during the repair of l2 = 1 failed node.
The information in the Twin MDS code framework is distributed same as in
the system in Example 1. We assume that Node 2 of Type 2 nodes fails. The
repair process of this failed node is shown in Fig. 7 (i), where the newcomer
contacts helper nodes: Node 1, Node 3, Node 4 and Node 5 of Type 1 to
recover the lost data. In Fig. 7 (ii) we present the revealed message symbols:
{r1, r2, r5, r6, a9, a10, a12, a14}, if the eavesdropper can read the data stored on
Node 1 of Type 2 and to the downloaded data during the repair process of the
failed Node 2 of Type 2. Therefore, although the data collector can reconstruct
the total information, the intruder can not reveal the entire message.
4.2 Information-theoretic secrecy in Twin MDS code frame-
work and DSS with MBR codes
In this subsection we compare the secrecy in Twin MDS code framework and
in storage system where the information is distributed with MBR codes in a
presence of passive eavesdroppers. Since from the MBR point during the repair
process the replacement node downloads only what it was stored we will consider
only l1 (l1 ≤ k) collaborating eavesdroppers which may gain access to the data
stored but not the data downloaded during the repair process of some nodes,
i.e., l2 = 0.
Corollary 2 (from Theorem 1) The Twin MDS code framework gives better
secrecy performance than MBR codes for β = 1 and α = d = k in presence of
l = l1 eavesdroppers, (l < k).
Plugging α = d = k in (17), the size of the secure message symbols achieved
with MBR codes, when β = 1 is
17
S(s) =
k − l
2
· (k + 1− l) . (19)
From Theorem 1 1) S
(s)
TW = k(k − l). So, since
k (k − l) ≥
k − l
2
· (k + 1− l) ,
follows that
S
(s)
TW ≥ S
(s) .
This means that the number of message symbols that can be securely stored
in the Twin-code framework is greater or equal than the number of the secure
message symbols stored in a system using MBR codes.
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Figure 8: (a) Comparison of the size of the message that can be securely stored
in Twin MDS code framework (squares) and MBR code (circles) for k = 50 in
presence of l = l1 = 1, ..., 49 eavesdroppers.
In Fig. 8 we compare the size of the secure message symbols in the Twin
MDS code storage system (squares) and a DSS with MBR codes (circles). From
this figure we notice that the size of the secure message symbols decreases in
both Twin MDS and MBR codes distributed networks as the number of passive
eavesdroppers increases. However, the secure file size in presence of l eavesdrop-
pers when β = 1 and α = d = k that supports the Twin MDS code framework
is greater or equal to the secure file size supported by MBR codes. Fig. 8 is a
graphical representation for the validity of Theorem 2.
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4.3 Information-theoretic Secrecy in Twin MDS code frame-
work and DSS with MSR codes
In [20], Goparaju et al. prove that the upper bound of the achievable secure
file size S(s) for the given (n, k, d), the MSR code, with α node storage capacity
and d contacted nodes during the repair process, in the situation when the
eavesdropper has access to the data stored on l1 nodes and to the downloaded
data from l2 systematic nodes is given by (18). Since in the Twin MDS codes
the connectivity must be at least d = 2k − 1, for the comparison of the secure
filze size distributed in Twin MDS code and the secure file size in the DSS with
MSR codes we plugging d = 2k − 1 in (18), the secure size file becomes
S(s) = α (k − l1 − l2)
(
k − 1
k
)l2
. (20)
Corollary 3 (from Theorem 1) The Twin MDS code framework gives better
secrecy performance than the MSR codes in a distributed storage system, when
β = 1, d = 2k − 1 and l = l1 + l2 (l < k) nodes are compromised.
The node storage capacity in a distributed storage system that uses MSR
codes with d = 2k − 1 is α = k. Hence, plugging α = k in (20) the achievable
secure file size in presence of both types of attacks is
S(s) = k (k − l1 − l2)
(
k − 1
k
)l2
.
From Theorem 1 2) in (l1, l2) eavesdropper model S
(s)
TW = k(k − l1 − l2).
Since 1 > k−1
k
, then
1 >
(
k − 1
k
)l2
,
which implies that
S
(s)
TW > S
(s).
This means that the secure file stored in the Twin MDS code framework is
larger in size than the secure file stored in a distributed storage system that
uses MSR codes in presence of eavesdroppers of both types.
In Fig. 9 we compare the size of the secure message between the Twin MDS
code storage system (dots) and the distributed storage system with MSR codes
(triangles). Although the number of secure message symbols decreases in both
cases, as the number of eavesdroppers that gain access to the data downloaded
during repair of some failed nodes is increasing, the secure file size is larger for
the Twin MDS code framework when β = 1 and d = 2k−1. Fig. 9 is a graphical
representation for the validity of Theorem 3.
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Figure 9: Comparison of the size of the message that can be securely stored
in Twin MDS code framework (dots) and MSR code (triangles), for k = 50 in
presence of l1 = 2 and l2 = 1, ..., 47 compromised nodes.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we considered reliable cloud storage system with more efficient
distribution than systems constructed with regenerating codes. Moreover, we
constructed a new secure storage framework in presence of passive eavesdrop-
pers. Two types of attack were taken into consideration. First one, when the
eavesdropper has an access in the data stored on nodes in the the cloud storage
system and second one, when the eavesdropper is observing the data down-
loaded during the repair process. We proved that when the eavesdropper has
an access in the stored data, the secure file size in this new storage framework is
greater than the secure file size in the DSS modeled with MBR codes, for β = 1,
α = k in presence of l = l1 (l < k) eavesdroppers; and in an eavesdropper model
with both types of attacks our storage framework supports greater secure file
size than the secure file size supported with the MSR codes, for β = 1 and
d = 2k − 1 in presence of l1 + l2 < k eavesdroppers.
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